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COCKPIT RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TRAINING:
ARE CURRENT INSTRUCTIONAL METHODS LIKELY TO BE SUCCESSFUL?
Gerald N. Cook
Abstract
Investigators and members of the National Transportation Safety Board attribute the cause of
the majority of airline accidents and incidents to pilot error. In an effort to address this problem,
many airlines have developed training programs for pilots aimed at Improving teamwork and
decision making in the cockpit. Much of this training, generally termed Cockpit Resource
Management (CRM), has leadership style assessment and modification through group exercise
as its foundation. Though cockpit resource management training has been widely embraced
within the aviation industry, its effectiveness in improving flight safety has yet to be demonstrated.
An argument is advanced that the current approach to this training is not likely to be effective.
Other approaches are suggested.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the jet age in 1958,
commercial air travel accident rates began a
precipitous decline (Sears, 1989), but by the
early 1970s the decline leveled off and has
remained low but nearly constant. Because of
jet aircraft systems' reliability and redundancy,
accidents due primarily to mechanical failure
are rare. The human system failure, the pilot, is
the causal factor in more than seventy percent
of commercial airline accidents (Lautman and
Gallimore, 1987).
Researchers at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA), in the early
1970's, began studying approaches to effect
further improvements in airline safety and
concluded that the root causes of pilot error
accidents must be addressed if the accident
rate were to be further lowered.
Contemporaneously, flight operations
managers at United Airlines came to similar
conclusions as a result of their investigations
at United and other airlines. One accident,
which has since become a classic in the study
of pilot error, galvanized support for a different
type of training for United's pilots. This new
approach to pilot training, now commonly
termed Cockpit Resource Management (CRM),
has been adopted by many airlines in an effort
to further improve airline safety. This paper
explores the foundations of CRM training and
its prospects for success.
CRASH OF UNITED FLIGHT 173
In December, 1978, United Flight 173, a DC-8
aircraft on a scheduled passenger flight from
Denver to Portland, Oregon crashed after the
crew delayed their approach and landing to
work on an unsafe landing gear indication. The
flight was routine until the gear extension was
accompanied by a loud thump, abnormal
vibration, aircraft yaw, and a red warning light
for the right main landing gear. Following
established procedure for this abnormality, the
flight engineer confirmed all main landing gear
were down and locked by a visual inspection
system designed for that purpose.
Some twenty-eight minutes after reporting the
gear problem to Portland air traffic controllers,
the captain contacted United's dispatch and
maintenance center controllers to discuss the
problem. All agreed that the appropriate
procedures had been completed. The
conversation ended approximately 30 minutes
before the aircraft crashed. For the remainder
of the flight, the captain's primary concern
seems to have been to allow the flight
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attendants time to prepare the cabin for an the organizational development firm founded
emergency landing. by Robert Blake and Jane Mouton. These
During that time, both the first officer and managers were quick to note the similarity in
flight engineer made several oblique and the problems of business management
unassertive references to the increasingly addressed by this training and those involved
critical fuel situation. So oblivious was the in the crash of United 173. Accordingly,
captain to those comments that when the first Scientific Methods was asked to develop a
of four engines quit and the first officer said, similar program for United's pilots (Oberle,
IIWe're losing an·-enginell, the captain asked, -..1990). Although United was not the first airline
IIWhy?1I The crew managed to keep the to implement management training for pilots,
remaining three engines running for another its initial commitment to CRM training was the
seven minutes; the DC-8 crashed six miles greatest, making United the industry leader in
from the runway after the remaining fuel was this area.
exhausted and all engines flamed-out (NTSB, Laboratory Education in Business
1979). Blake and Mouton were the developers of the
For many, the crash exemplified what was Managerial Grid for assessing leadership styles
wrong with airline pilots and their approach to and were early proponents of laboratory
teamwork in the cockpit. Foushee and education in business. Intensive group
Helmreich (1988) have argued that both experience education, known variously as T-
traditional pilot selection and training are, in group, encounter group, sensitivity training,
part, responsible for these deficiencies. They and laboratory education, was developed and
point out that many airlines have long favored extensively employed in many companies for
the military single-seat fighter pilot for hiring, the two decades following World War II
the type immortalized by Tom Wolfe (1979) as (Kaplan, 1986).
having The right stuff. IIMost of us are familiar In the earliest stages, managers from different
with the common stereotype of the pilot as a companies or work areas were assembled in
fearless, self-sufficient, technically qualified, training groups but not provided with any
and slightly egotistical individual, whose job specific direction or given any explicit task. The
description calls for the defiance of death on a role of the educator or facilitator was not to
regular basis·· (Foushee and Helmreich, 1988 provide structure but rather to encourage the
p 191). Pilots who have this background and group members to identify and communicate
self-image are unlikely to function well in the their feelings about the group, its work as it
multi-pilot crew when there is a need for evolved, and its members. This feedback was
teamwork and group decision processes. considered the most important product of the
While Foushee and Helmreich may have process (Argyris, 1964). The objective was to
overestimated the extent to which this develop an ability for Ilopenness·1 which the
personality type is evident in airline cockpits, manager could then use on the job. Later
some of the attitudes to which they refer are developments included the use of interactive
common (Helmreich, 1984). work groups and the introduction of a series of
DEVELOPMENT OF LABORATORY more structured tasks for the group to perform.
EDUCATION FOR PILOTS Current methods for the management-team-
At the time of the accident, some United building aspect of organizational development
managers were participating in a training are direct results of initial work in laboratory
program provided by Scientific Methods, Inc., education (Lewis, 1975). Regardless of the
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training method advocated, scholars and
practitioners believed that controlling,
autocratic leadership styles, to the exclusion of
relationships within the group, were
counterproductive (Horstein, Heilman, Mone,
and Tartell, 1987).
Laboratory education was intended to
heighten sensitivity to the importance of
relationships. -~Underlying .teamwork --values·
were the free flow of valid information, a spirit
of inquiry, nondefensiveness, and
collaboration. These qualities seemed the
perfect prescription for avoiding accidents like
the Portland crash.
CRM Training at United Airlines
The United CRM program uses the
Managerial Grid as the basis for examining
individual leadership style. The Managerial Grid
allows for various management styles to be
depicted on coordinate system where the X
axis measures concern for production or task
behavior with the V axis showing concern for
people or relationship behavior.
The course introduction states that when the
grid is Ilunderstood it provides a comparative
basis for seeing teamwork and how individuals
contribute to it or prevent it from occurring by
the way in which they interact with one
another-I (Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 3). This
emphasis is necessary because Iwell-educated
and technically proficient crew members . . .
rarely understand what makes people tick.11
(Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 2). Vet the skills in
working with other crew members are essential
to Ilreaching informed, strategically sound
decisions and taking action accordingly.11
(Scientific Methods, 1988, p. 1).
Objectives of the course are five: (a) gain
insight into one's own style of action, (b) set
standards for advocacy and inquiry based on
openness and candor, (c) learn effective use of
the captain's authority and crew member
leadership, (d) develop principles of synergistic
teamwork, and (e) understand the impact of
external forces on cockpit behavior.
Small teams of pilots work together intensely
for three and a half days on a series of
projects. This teamwork allows participants to
develop skills in inquiry, advocacy, conflict
solving, decision making, and critiqueing. The
developers say these skills will not be taught
but will develop through group interaction. At
the end of the session, team members
evaluate each other's strengths and
weaknesses. This sometimes harsh evaluation
by peers is intended to promote reflection and
lead to' a change of attitude and behavior.
CRM Training at Other Airlines
Cockpit resource management training,
though not yet required by regulation, has
been introduced in some form at most major
airlines. Many programs are patterned after
United's course and most programs use some
form of leadership style assessment and group
feedback.
EFFICACY
Despite wide acceptance by the airline
industry and ten years experience in CAM
training, there is no conclusive evidence this
training is effective in improving flight safety.
Certainly pilot-error accidents continue to
occur. Nevertheless, an accident is such a low
frequency occurrence that a short-term change
in the accident rate will not be statistically
significant in proving the efficacy of training.
Some anecdotal evidence, however, has been
offered. United, which had not had a hull-loss
accident since beginning its training program
in 1979, suffered two accidents in 1989. One,
a Boeing 747 on climb out of Honolulu lost a
forward cargo door resulting in serious flight
control problems and several passengers
being sucked through the gaping hole in the
fuselage.
The second occurred when the center engine
of a DC-1 0 aircraft exploded in flight, resulting
28
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in severe control problems and a spectacular
televised crash landing at Sioux City, Iowa.
Both captains credited their crews' CRM
training for reducing the loss of life in these
accidents (Langer, 1990). Still, this testimony is
not considered hard statistical evidence and
the vested interest of United Airlines must be
acknowledged.
Helmreich' (1984) .. has argued· that -0- CRM
training programs may be effective in changing
pilot attitudes but are unlikely to affect
underlying personalities. Further, there is
evidence that personality is linked to pilot
performance, including cockpit management.
If personality is the predominant determinant of
cockpit management behavior, then airline
managers should concentrate on pilot
selection rather than on training and allow
cockpit management to gradually improve with
the retirement of those pilots with inappropriate
personality traits.
In research at one airline, however, Helmreich
has found that attitudes toward cockpit
management differ significantly by pilot
position, i.e. captain, first officer, second
officer. Because personality traits were not
similarly linked to position, it would seem that
personality traits and attitudes toward cockpit
management are independent. In subsequent
research at the same carrier, a significant
correlation between attitudes and flight deck
performance in cockpit management was
found (Helmreich, Foushee, Benson, and
Russini, 1986).
CRM training has been shown to have a
positive influence on pilot attitudes both as
measured by pilots' subjective evaluation of
the usefulness of the training and by
psychological testing administered pre- and
post- training (Helmreich, Chidester, Foushee,
Gregorich, and Wilhelm, 1989). If CRM training
is effective in changing pilots' attitudes, it
should have a positive effect on actual cockpit
management.
Helmreich and his colleagues reported
preliminary results indicating CRM training
does translate to improved cockpit
management behaviors in actual and simulated
flight (Helmreich, Wilhelm, Gregorich, &
Chidester, 1990). The researchers face several
methodological problems. Perhapsthe greatest
difficulty is in obtaining consistency of
evaluation from the pilots measuring cockpit
management performance.
Although the degree of efficacy is yet to be
determined, the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) (1989), sufficiently convinced that CRM
training will be effective in improving safety,
has proposed such training for all airline pilots.
CRITICISMS
There has been no research on the best
pedagogical methods for CRM training. This
lack of evidence notwithstanding, there are
reasons to question whether programs which
place a heavy emphasis on leadership style
assessment, feedback, and introspection are
likely to be effective in improving airline safety.
These questions involve (a) the underlying
analysis of the causes of pilot error accidents,
(b) the dissimilarity in the working roles of
airline pilots and business managers, and (c)
the history of ineffectiveness of laboratory
training in business.
Questionable Analysis
Though not ignoring other combinations of
task and relationship attitudes and behaviors,
much current CRM thinking stresses the
problem combination of the autocratic, task-
oriented captain and the timid, unassertive
subordinate crewmembers as in the case of
the crew of United 173. Thus, much of the
emphasis is on the concern for people or the
relationships dimension of management style.
Data suggests that many pilot-error accidents
involve failures in areas which are the domain
of traditional pilot training programs. In a study
of fatal air carrier accidents worldwide from
1977 through 1988, Sears (1989) found that
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Table 1
The Significant Accident Causes and Their
Percentage of Presence in 93 Major
Accidents
33% Pilot deviated from basic operation
procedures.
26% Inadequate crosscheck by 2nd crew
member.
*9% Crews not conditioned for proper
response during abnormal conditions.
*6% Pilot did not recognize the need for go-
around.
4% Pilot incapacitation.
*4% Inadequate piloting skills.
3% Crew errors during training flights.
*3% Pilot not trained to respond promptly to
GPWS command.
*3% Pilot unable to execute safe landing or
go-around when runway sighting is lost
below MDA or DH.
3% Operational procedures did not require
use of available approach aids.
*3% Captain inexperienced in aircraft type.
Source: The Boeing Airliner April/June 1987
* Factors suggesting a lack of technical knowledge and/or basic
flying skills in the author's opinion.
deviations from standard operating procedures
were a significant factor in thirty-seven percent.
Training and practice of standard operating
procedures for both normal and abnormal
situations constitutes a large portion of
traditional pilot training. In its investigation of
two recent accidents resulting from the failure
of the flight crews to properly set flaps for
takeoff (Northwest at Detroit and Delta at
Dallas), the National Transportation Safety
Board (NTSB)(1988, 1989) found in both cases
the captains failed to maintain cockpit
discipline and follow standard operating
procedures.
In another study conducted at Boeing Aircraft,
Lautman and Gallimore (1987) found that
twelve percent of all commercial aircraft
operators accounted for ninety percent of all
accidents. Although the study was not
scientifically based, a series of interviews
showed that standardization and cockpit
discipline was a common element of those
operators with the best safety records.
In an early study, Sears (1986) found a lack of
technical knowledge and/or basic flying skills
to be a contributing factor in approximately
thirty percent of air carrier accidents (Table 1).
These findings suggest that more emphasis
should be placed on task behavior in CAM
training.
Dissimilarity of Pilot and ManagementTeams
To the extent that the importance of
relationships should also be stressed in CRM
training, there is reason to question whether
group exercises are an effective means of
doing so. Since laboratory education was
designed to address the problems of
openness in management teams and CRM
training draws directly on this foundation,
significant differences between the work of
management and pilot teams may invalidate
assumptions about the transferability of the
training.
Both by tradition and federal law, an airline
captain has absolute authority over the
operation of his/her crew and the aircraft. A
manager has similar responsibilities though
perhaps more limited authority. For most
situations the similarity ends here. For all
normal flying situations, procedures for aircraft
operations are highly developed, specific in
detail, and intended to be precisely followed.
The same is true for all abnormal conditions
which have been anticipated. Traditional pilot
training emphasizes rote learning and
practicing of these procedures. In contrast,
high level management teams operate in a
world of much less certainty, in longer time
horizons, and in environments over which
management has little control.
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Lewis (1975) delineates the conditions most
favorable for the operation of integrated
management teams most likely to benefit from
team development training. Among those
conditions are: (a) An external environment
that is highly variable and/or changing rapidly;
(b) an organization which is young and/or
undergoing major change, which results in
fluid structure, - few operating policies and
procedures, and emerging role definitions; (c)
technology that is relatively new and/or
developing rapidly; and (d) a tendency towards
frequent use of project management,
temporary task forces, and/or ad hoc problem-
solving groups to augment conventional
organizational structures.
These conditions are not characteristic of the
airline pilot's job, and by extension, team
building may be inappropriate. To the contrary,
Argyris (1964) acknowledges that directive
style leadership is appropriate for routine
decisions and extreme emergencies. These, in
fact, are exactly the working conditions faced
by airline pilots. A well-known adage among
pilots characterizes their job lias hours and
hours of boredom interspersed with moments
of sheer terror .11
Continuity is an additional significant
difference between· management teams and
airline crews. Whereas management team
members can be expected to take some time
to get to know one another, develop working
relationships, and then work together for an
extended period, it is common for airline pilots
to meet for the first time and one hour later to
have to function as a highly integrated team
performing a complex task. At larger airlines, it
is also common for a crew to work together for
one month and then possibly never again.
Such teamwork can be accomplished only by
adherence to detailed standard operating
procedures.
Effectiveness of Laboratory Training in
Business
Laboratory training programs for
management, which are the basis for many
CRM programs, eventually proved
disappointing even to their advocates. Chris
Argyris (1979), who championed the cause of
laboratory education for manyyears, eventually
~ concluded l'there may be factors endemic to
the theory and practice of the laboratory
education that act to inhibit transferabilityll
(p.197). Kaplan (1986) concludes that
laboratory training failed for two reasons: (a)
Some participants were hurt in the process
and their working relations damaged, and (b)
those who felt positive about the process were
generally unable to apply what they had
learned in the training. There is evidence that
both of these problems are results of current
CRM training.
Although reporting a positive shift in attitudes
by most pilots participating in CRM programs,
Helmreich, et al (1989) have found a negative
reaction in about fifteen percent of those
trained. The data indicate those pilots reacting
most negatively are low in both task and
relationships on the grid measurement system.
These are the pilots judged to be most in need
of improvement.
While the developers of the United CRM
program deny it, elements of T-group and
sensitivity training are certainly involved (Public
Broadcasting System, 1986). During a sales
presentation of the course to this author, the
Scientific Methods representative explained
with apparent satisfaction how he had
witnessed senior captains and, in one
instance, a chief pilot, break down and cry
before the group during the final evaluation.
As Jack Gordon (1989) sees it, this
"personality shredding is a pretty fair
description of what went on in some sensitivity
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training sessions, and that at least a few NEW APPROACHES TO CRM TRAINING
people were seriously wounded" (p.29). Current approaches of CRM training have
Problems can occur elsewhere even when been questioned by others. John Lauber in his
training does not involve such direct feedback presentation to the Annual Airline Operations
as was characteristic of early sensitivity Forum, Airline Safety in a transitional era
training. Following the breakup of AT&T, (November, 1988), stated his concern that
Pacific Bell instituted a corporate-wide program "some of us have fallen into the dangerous
called Leadership Development. The waters of 'hot tub harmony'. What I mean by
company's director of· training noted that -the - .-this is that I see signs of too much emphasis
program "was a long way from sensitivity on interpersonal relationships in some of the
training" (Gordon, 1989 p. 38). Nonetheless, approaches to cockpit resource management,
following complaints by some employees and and not enough emphasis on command and
an investigation by the California Public Utilities leadership skills.II Doug Schwartz of
Commission, the program was dropped. These FlightSafety International describes an
results could have been anticipated. In an early evolution from first generation CRM programs,
article advocating T-group training, Argyris which emphasized open ,communication,
(1964) cautions that individuals who are highly teamwork, and advocacy, to training which will
defensive should not be involved in the provide specific and measurable cockpit
training. behaviors (Hughes, 1989).
The second reason cited by Kaplan for the The foregoing criticism is not intended to
failure of laboratory education is that even suggest leadership style analysis has no place
when participants had a positive reaction, they in pilot education. In fact, an appreciation of
frequently had difficulty applying what they had the various leadership styles can provide
learned once they returned to the job. Given valuable insights into pilots. Given evidence
this difficulty, positive effects are short-lived. that such attempts have not been successful in
Similar criticisms have been leveled at CRM business settings, and in the absence of
training. Walker and Youngblood (1989) note: explicitly defined behaviors to be used in the
"Some of the existing programs rely heavily on cockpit, the question is what amount of scarce
self-analysis without emphasis on actually training time should be spent in an attempt to
working together or giving skills to use while modify existing pilot attitudes and leadership
working in the cockpit. While self-analysis may styles.
give some personal in-sight into individual There are other elements of CRM training,
styles of management, it does not deal with some old and some more recently developed,
how to apply skills to working better with other which promise to be effective.
crew members" (p. 56). The difficulty stems Standard Operating Procedures
from an emphasis on attitudes and motivations First, the importance of strict adherence to
rather than on behaviors. To be effective, existing standard operating procedures must
training programs must identify behaviors be stressed. Case study of accidents,
which are objective, observable, and particularly when video recreations are
measurable (Luthans, Maciag, and available, should be effective. Strong flight
Rosenkrantz, 1983, cited in Kirkpatrick, 1988). operations management support is critical to
Most CRM programs fail to define the cockpit the development of norms requiring the use of
behaviors that should result from the training standard procedures.
program.
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Safety Monitor
Procedures can be developed which delegate
the role of safety monitor to the non-flying pilot
who should be responsible for challenging any
deviation from standard procedure in much the
same way that a challenge to a deviation from
a stabilized approach profile is now required.
There are circumstances when deviation from
standard procedure· is .appropriate,. but the
reasons for such a deviation must first be fully
established and explained to the crew. The
safety monitor would also bring to the attention
of the flying pilot information critical to the safe
operation of the aircraft (Bolman. 1979).
Error Chain
Most accidents are the result of a unique
series of events and errors. no one of which
may be uncommon or. in isolation. would lead
to an accident (Sears. 1986). If this lIerror
chainll could be detected and broken while in
progress, accidents could be avoided.
FlightSafety has developed a list of clues
which may point to an error chain in progress
(Table 2) (Schwartz, 1989).
Decision Processes
Although decision making is frequently
mentioned in CRM training. the actual process
is seldom more than superficially explored. It
seems an assumption has been made that if
sufficient openness in the cockpit can be
instilled. good decisions will certainly follow.
Many decisions in aviation are highly
structured and programmable. consequently
Table 2
Error Chain Elements
1" • Ambiguity
2. Fixation and/or Preoccupation
3. Confusion or Empty Feeling
4. No one flying the aircraft
5. No one looking out window
6. Use of undocumented procedure
7. Violating minimums and/or li.mitations
8. Unresolved discrepancy
9. Failure to meet targets
1o. Departure from standard operating
procedure
11 . Communication failure
Source: Schwartz (1989)
detailed procedures exist for most mechanical
problems. But pilots also occasionally face
non-programmable decisions which are left to
pilot judgment. The aviation community has
generally felt that pilot judgment is either innate
in good pilots or acquired over time, but were
not a proper subject of formal training (Buch
and Diehl. 1984).
This attitude is in contrast to business
management training which devotes
considerable effort to developing business
judgment. Understanding the classical decision
model and practice in its application to aviation
problems can be effective.
CONCLUSION
CRM is not the only avenue being explored to improve the safety of air travel. The newest
generation of commercial aircraft make extensive use of computers to automate functions which
heretofore required pilot control. Though the introduction of high levels of automation presents
new cockpit management problems (Wiener. 1989). there is reason to believe that these newer
aircraft will be safer. Since pilot error continues to a major contributor to commercial aircraft
accidents. work to improve the human system holds the greatest promise for improving airline
safety. Formal CRM training is more than ten years old and has been adopted by most airlines.
Preliminary research results indicate the training is effective in improving cockpit management
behaviors. There is no research on the relative effectiveness of various approaches to CRM
training, but there are reasons to question whether approaches which emphasize assessment
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and modification of leadership styles through group exercises will be effective. Until research
results are available, CRM training should de-emphasize the study of leadership styles so that
other promising approaches to training can be included.
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management and a Bachelor of Science in
REFERENCES
Argyris, C. (1964). T-groups for organizational effectiveness. Harvard Business Review, 42, 60-74.
Argyris, C. (1979). Reflecting on laboratory education from a theory of action perspective. Journal of
Applied Behavioral Science, 1979, 15, 296-310.
Bolman, L. (1979). Aviation accidents and the 'theory of the situation'. In G. E. Cooper, M. D. White, & J.
K. Lauber (Eds.), Resource Management on the Flight Deck, Proceedings of a NASA/Industry Workshop
(pp.31 - 57). San Francisco, CA. National Aeronautics and Space Administration publication 2120.
Buch, G., & Diehl, A. (1984). An investigation of the effectiveness of pilot judgement training. Human
Factors, 26(5). 557-564.
Federal Aviation Administration.(1989).Cockpit Resource management training.(AC no. 120-51).
Washington, D. C.
Foushee, C. & Helmreich, R. L, (1988). Group interaction and flight crew performance. In E. L. Wiener &
D. C. Nagel (Eds.), Human Factors in Aviation (pp. 189-225). San Diego: Academic Press.
Gordon, J. (1989). Where's the line between training and intrusion? Training, 26(3), 27-39.
Helmreich, R. L, (1984). Cockpit management attitudes. Human Factors, 26(5),583-589.
Helmreich, R. L, Chidester, T. R., Foushee, H. C., Gregorich, S., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1989). How effective
is cockpit resource management training? Issues in evaluating the impact ofprograms to enhance crew
coordination. (Draft, NASA/UT Technical report 89-2). Moffett Field, CA: NASA-Ames Research Center.
Helmreich, R. L, Foushee, H. C., Benson, R., & Russini, W. (1986). Cockpit resource Management:
Exploring the attitude-performance linkage. Aviation, Space, and Environmental Medicine, 1198-1200.
Helmreic,h, R. L, Wilhelm, J. A., Gregorich, S. E., & Chidester, T. R. (1990). Preliminary results from the
evaluation of cockpit resource management training: Performance ratings of flightcrews. Aviation, Space,
and Environm~ntalMedicine, 61, 576-579.
Hornstein, H. A., Heilman, M. E., Mone, E., & TarteII, R. (1987). Responding to contingent leadership
behavior. Organizational Dynamics, 15(4), 56 - 65.
Hughes, D. (1989, October 16). New approaches to pilot training stress human factors, coordination.
Aviation Week and Space Technology, pp. 86 - 87.
Kaplan, R. E. (1986). Is openness passe? Human Relations, 39(3), 229 -243.
Kirkpatrick, D. L. (1988). How to manage ch~nge effectively. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Langer, H. A. (1990, April).Human performance research laboratory dedication. Paper presented at the
dedication of the Human Performance Research Laboratory dedication, NASA Ames Research Center,
Ca.
Lauber, J. K. (1988. November). Airline safety in a transitional era. Keynote address at the annual airline
operations forum of the Air Transport Association, Williamsburg, VA.
Lautman, L., & Gallimore, P. (1987 April-June). Control of crew-caused accidents. The Boeing Airliner.
Lewis, J. W. (1975). Management team development: Will it work for you? Personnel, (§g), 11 - 25.
34
9
Cook: Cockpit Resource Management Training: Are Current Instructional M
Published by Scholarly Commons, 1991
Luthans. F., Maciag. W. S., & Rosenkrantz, S. A. (1983, March-April). O. B. mod: Meeting the productivity
challenge with human resources management. Personnel. pp.28-36.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1979). Aircraft accident report. United Airlines, Inc. McDonnell-
Douglas DC-8-61, N8082U, Portland. Oregon. December 28. 1978 (Report No. NTSB-AAR-79-7).
Washington, D. C.: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1988). Aircraft accident report. Northwest Airlines, Inc. McDonnell-
Douglas MC-9-82, N312RC, Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport, Romulus, MI, August 16, 1987
(Report No. NTSB-AAR-88-05). Washington, D.C.: Author.
National Transportation Safety Board. (1989). Aircraft accident report, Delta Air Lines, Inc. Boeing 727-232,
N473DA, Dallas-Ft. Worth International Airport. Tx, August" 31, 1988 (RepOrt No. NTSB/AAR-89/04).
Washington, D. C.: Author.
Oberle, J. (1990). Teamwork in the cockpit. Training, 27(2), 34 - 38.
Public Broadcasting System. (1987). Why airplanes crash (TV documentary). [Interview with M. Voltz,
United Air Unes]. Boston, MA: WGBH.
Schwartz, D. (1989, ApriO. Training for situational awareness" Paper presented at the fifth international
symposium on aviation psychology, Columbus, OH.
Scientific Methods Inc. (1988). Cockpit Resource Management (Unpublished report). Austin, TX: Author.
Sears, R. L (1986). A new look at accident contributions and the implications of operational and training
procedures. Unpublished report. Boeing Commercial Airplane Company.
Sears, R. L. (1989, February). Prevention strategies for the crew-caused accident. Paper presented at the
second Egyptian Aircraft Accident Investigation and Prevention Annual Seminar, Cairo, Egypt.
Walker, S. & Youngblood, H. (1989). A review of CRM training within the Alaska Air Group and its
application accident Investigation. Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Seminar of the
International Society of Air Safety Investigators. volume 23, #4. (p. 56) Vancouver, British Columbia,
Canada.
Wiener, E. L. (1989). The human factors ofadvanced technology rglass cockpir) transport aircraft, (NASA
contract report 177528). Moffett Field, CA: MASA Ames Research Center.
Wolfe, T. (1979). The right stuff. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux.
35
10
Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, Vol. 1, No. 3 [1991], Art. 4
https://commons.erau.edu/jaaer/vol1/iss3/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/jaaer.1991.1029
